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Abstract
As the study of political networks becomes more common in political science, greater
attention to questions of causality is warranted. This essay explores competing visions
of causality in political networks. Independent essays address issues of statistical model
specification, identification ofmulti-step personal influence, measurement error, causality
in historical perspective, and the insights of field experiments. These essays do not agree
entirely on the nature of causality in political networks, though they commonly take se-
riously concerns regarding homophily, time-consistency, and the uniqueness of political
network data. Serious consideration of these methodological issues promises to enhance
the value-added of network analysis in the study of politics.
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1 Introduction
By Michael T. Heaney
The study of social networks has grown exponentially across the social and natural sci-
ences over the past decade. AWeb of Science search on the term “social networks” shows
that the annual number of articles published on this topic rose from about 200 in 1998 to
over 800 in 2008. In political science, articles on networks once appeared only occasion-
ally, but now articles using network theory, data, and methodology appear regularly in
the leading journals in the discipline. Network studies span the subfields of political sci-
ence, exploring the outcomes of individuals, institutions and policies through both direct
and indirect relationships.
Although the metaphor of “network” has long resonated in political science as a way
of thinking about systems of power, influence, and communication, it has only recently
gained currency as a formal model of political behavior. We see several factors are behind
this growth in political network analysis. First, recent studies offer compelling explana-
tions of observed phenomena, including research on social capital (Putnam 2000), sexual
contacts (Laumann et al. 2004), small worlds (Watts 1999), power laws (Barabasi 2003),
and business success (Burt 2005). A second factor is the availability of inexpensive and
easy-to-learn computer tools for social network analysis, such as UCINET (Borgatti, Ev-
erett, and Freeman 2009), as well as increased ease of access to large network data sets
using electronic tools. Third, the emergence of on-line social networks (e.g., Facebook,
LinkedIn) has drawn attention to networks by mass media and citizens across the world.
A final factor is the contagion that comes from an innovation spreading through formal
and informal networks – appropriately enough. More and more people – inside and out-
side of political science – are coming to see the applicability of social networks in their
day-to-day personal, political, and professional lives.
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With the emergence of any new research paradigm, a reasonable amount of caution is
warranted. If social network analysis is to endure within political science – rather than
being a brief flash in the pan – it must approach theoretical and methodological devel-
opment carefully. Specifically, we believe that not enough attention has been given to
the nature of causality in political network analysis. Political scientists who study net-
works have drawn heavily upon advances in other disciplines – especially sociology and
physics – yet scholars in these areas tend to have very different ideas of what constitutes
an adequate causal argument than do many scholars in political science. As methods
travel from discipline to discipline, do causal ideas travel as well? Is there anything spe-
cial about the substance of politics that merits a different kind of approach than, say, the
questions in epidemiology or population biology? Many network ideas and techniques
travel, but perhaps some require modest translation.
This article is a series of independent essays that address questions of causality in po-
litical networks. The authors are not in full agreement over the requirements for assessing
causality in political networks, only over the primacy of the question. The authors sim-
ilarly confront the dilemmas arising from the fact that social networks are embedded in
recursive causal processes. For example, a person inherits her/his political views, in part,
from her/his network – parents, teachers, friends – but then subsequently chooses new
members of the network based, in part, on her/his political views. Confounding the
situation is the principle of homophily, which posits that individuals prefer to connect
with others who are like themselves. As a result, standard statistical models (e.g., OLS
regression) do a poor job of representing network effects. But, if the standard models are
insufficient for dealing with networks, then which models are? How should causality
be examined in the presence of political networks? The five authors of this article offer
different answers to this question.
The first three essays in the article – by Betsy Sinclair, James H. Folwer, and Michael
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T. Heaney, respectively – focus on statistical analysis in answering this question. Sinclair
explores the assumptions used in drawing inferences about the effects of political net-
works in national random samples. She considers, in particular, the relevance of small
sample sizes, identification, recall and truthfulness, and contextual effects. Fowler, in
contrast, focuses more narrowly on pinpointing indirect personal influence in large social
networks, accounting for random clustering, homophily, contextual effects, and influence
in this examination. While Sinclair and Fowler search for statistical models to improve
our understanding of causality, Heaney targets the measurement process to resolve these
puzzles. Sinclair claims that it is necessary to assume that data are reported truthfully
in order to undertake analysis, while Heaney considers what happens when we know
that those data are not reported truthfully, or are at least reported with some error. He
summarizes the advantages of obtrusive measurement of political networks, but then
proposes methods to reduce measurement errors generated in the process, including the
use of comparative modeling, multiple measures, explicit error models, and reframing
interview/survey instruments.
Although the essays by Sinclair, Fowler, and Heaney place faith in statistical models
to address questions of network causality, the final two essays in the article – by John F.
Padgett and David W. Nickerson – mutually question the adequacy of statistical analysis
of observational data (either in a cross-sectional or panel framework) to address satisfac-
torily the questions at hand. Nonetheless, Padgett and Nickerson embrace radically dif-
ferent solutions to the problem. For Padgett, causality is understood properly over long
historical periods using relational databases that may be incomplete in significant ways.
This approach requires the analyst to gather multiple sources of evidence and triangulate
on the causal processes at hand. For Nickerson, causality is understood properly by us-
ing experiments in organic social networks. Thus, the political scientist is able to pinpoint
changes in micro-political behavior and short-term adjustments in social networks. Nick-
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erson argues that best practices using this method demand that networks be measured in
advance of any experiments and, potentially, following the experiment as well, if feasible.
This approach – because of its concern for the pervasive confounds produced by dynamic
political networks – is anathema to the simulation and analytical identification methods
proposed above by Fowler and Sinclair.
This article makes no pretense to reconcile the varying views of its contributors on the
question of causality in political networks. The historian and the experimentalist are en-
gaged in very different projects that seek answers on fundamentally different scales. The
statistician is stuck in the middle, seeking a widely generalizable result over a moderate
timeframe. Nonetheless, the views presented here collectively map out the major issues
and approaches confronting causal inference in political networks. Both current and fu-
ture scholars should give careful attention to these questions when using network ideas
to study politics.
2 The Social Citizen: Social Networks via Surveys of Na-
tional Random Samples
By Betsy Sinclair
The Erie County Study of 1940 and the Elmira Community Study of 1948 report find-
ing positive and significant effects of peers on individual political behavior from detailed
panel samples of small, local communities (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1948; Berel-
son, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954).1 In recent years, there has been a renaissance of this
original literature, with studies conducted on different community samples to investigate
the effect of peer networks on vote choice, social communication, expertise, and disagree-
ment (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1988, 1991, 1994; Huckfeldt et al. 1995; Huckfeldt 1995;
Huckfeldt et al. 1998; Mondak, Mutz, and Huckfeldt 1996). However, the applicability
1For a review of this literature and the Columbia School findings, see Eulau 1980.
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of community-based surveys has come into question, as many scholars claim that Amer-
icans are increasingly ”bowling alone” and replacing neighborhood social interactions
with online social interactions (Putnam 2000; Sunstein 2001). In particular, if respondents
are more likely to have discussion partners who are geographically distant, then knowl-
edge of the respondent’s geography is not sufficient to control for the information they
would receive from peers. It is then crucial to know something about the structure of the
social network if peer-to-peer communication affects political choices.
This concern has resulted in the inclusion of network batteries on surveys of national
probability samples, including the General Social Survey (GSS) and the American Na-
tional Election Study (ANES). These surveys are now being used to document and ex-
plain behaviors beyond the standard decision calculus which considers behavior solely
as a function of individual preference, probability of impact, or civic responsibilities. Anal-
yses from these surveys may still be problematic, for example, while the 1985 GSS, 1987
GSS, and 2000 ANES all included social network batteries asking respondents to provide
demographic and political information about their discussion partners, these surveys
do not elicit enough data to draw causal inferences about the effects of peer networks
without additional assumptions about selection and homophily. For example, the 2000
ANES does not include any questions regarding the socioeconomic status of the discus-
sant, the geographic location of the discussant, or the propensity of the discussant to vote.
Thus causal inferences regarding influence of the discussants on the respondents’ polit-
ical choices cannot be determined without assumptions regarding the selection process,
as it is possible that both respondent and discussant have identical preferences and are
connected based upon those preferences.2
Analyses of these data need to address four key issues. First, as most of the surveys
2The GSS includes variables which account for socioeconomic status, but neglects the geographic loca-
tion of the discussant and some key political variables.
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using national probability samples ask for only a small number of discussants, it is nec-
essary to assume that these few individuals are an appropriate proxy for all the peer in-
fluences an individual will receive. Second, identification of peer effects is only possible
after assessing network selection based upon homophily. Third, it is necessary to assume
that the respondent will appropriately recall and truthfully describe her network alters
demographics and political preferences. Fourth, it is necessary to elicit the respondent’s
contextual influences. Causal inferences can be drawn only after accounting for all four
of these issues and addressing the possibility of unobserved variation driving the results.
2.1 Small Sample Size
Within most surveys which include network batteries, respondents are asked to identify
a small number of discussants, usually three to six, who compose their social network. In
order to rely upon these surveys, it is necessary to assume that these discussants are repre-
sentative of the respondent’s larger social sphere. Literature which attempts to estimate
network size suggests that the average network contains somewhere between 290-750
people (McCarty et al. 2001; Killworth et al. 1990; Zheng, Salganik and Gelman 2009).
If we anticipate that individuals are most likely to be persuaded by weak ties, then it is
possible that these weak ties are not included in the small set of individuals identified
by the respondent (Mutz 2006). However, we observe the consistent presence of some
disagreement across these survey responses; while this may be an underestimate of the
actual amount of political disagreement an individual is exposed to from their broader
network it does include some heterogeneity of preferences. Analysis of network surveys
requires the assumption that these respondents are representative of – or at least the pri-
mary influences within – an individual’s political network.
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2.2 Identification
Homophily is a well-documented phenomena within social relationships where there is
a tendency for individuals to form social ties with others who are similar (Lazarsfeld and
Merton 1954; Coleman 1958; McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001). Homophily is
most likely to occur with respect to race and ethnicity, age, religion, education, occupa-
tion, and gender, roughly in that order (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001). Little
research has investigated the extent to which relationships will form based upon political
behavior or preferences, but there are high degrees of correlation between an individual’s
party identification and those of her discussants, suggesting that some relationships may
form based upon shared political values (Lazar et al. 2008). If social relationships are
formed based upon shared political preferences or behaviors, then the correlation that is
present between the respondent and her network is based upon selection and not on peer
influence.
Fortunately, homophily fails to characterize all of an individual’s social relationships,
as many social ties are formed based upon availability and not solely on personal choice
(Mollenhorst, Volker and Flap 2008, 2007). It is likely that an individual will choose some
of her peers based upon shared politics. Identification of peer effects is only possible
when there are some fraction of discussants who are chosen based upon availability – re-
lationships which were selected not based upon shared political preferences. Accounting
for the degree of shared characteristics is key in the analysis of peer effects; it is within
those relationships where there is not homophily that is possible to identify peer effects.
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2.3 Recall and Truthfulness
Survey respondents usually are asked to provide names of individuals with whom they
have discussed “government, elections, and politics”.3 They are then asked to identify
a full set of characteristics of each discussant, including their socioeconomic and demo-
graphic characteristics, their relationship to the respondent, and their political preferences
and choices. One large concern with the analysis of these data is that the respondent will
fail to identify correctly and recall all of this information.
Huckfeldt and Sprague (1987, 1988) and Huckfeldt, Sprague and Levine (2000) con-
ducted snowball surveys on political discussion partners where they conducted a second-
wave survey of the discussants. They found that approximately 80% of all respondents
were able to correctly identify the political preferences of their discussants, and that of the
20% mis-identified, approximately 3/4 believed the discussant agreed with the respon-
dent. Analysis of the self-reported social network data should consider these findings as
a mechanism to adjust for the level of disagreement in the network. However, it is pos-
sible that the belief of the respondent regarding the discussants’ preferences within the
mis-identified relationships is the key variable – not the true discussant preferences.
2.4 Contextual Effects
One great advantage of the national probability sample surveys is that they elicit indepen-
dent networks, where spillovers of treatment effects are not a concern from one network
to another.4 These data have the added benefit of providing variation in the context of
the respondents, so that all individuals within the network are not exposed to a common,
unobserved variable. Yet these data are exposed to a standard criticism of observational
network data, which is that unaccounted environmental factors or other unobserved fac-
3Surveys often ask for discussants of ”important matters”. There are minimal differences between these
two name-generators (Klofstad, McClurg and Rolfe 2009).
4For an example of such an effect, see Nickerson 2008.
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tors could drive the relationship between the respondent and her discussants (Cohen-
Cole and Fletcher 2009).5 The sole solution for this problem in survey research is to ask
additional questions of the respondent to control for context, as well as to be able to locate
the respondent geographically and append additional data to the respondent’s physical
location.
2.5 Conclusion: Causal Inferences
Drawing causal inferences about the effect of an individual’s social network on her po-
litical behavior when using survey data from national probability samples requires par-
ticular care, significant data resources, and several assumptions. Under the best of cir-
cumstances, the available data would document the presence of heterogeneity in char-
acteristics of the network members with respect to the respondent, include a full set of
individual characteristics, and document and control for the respondent’s context and
susceptibility. It is further necessary to assume that the network data are reported truth-
fully. A panel survey would provide an ideal research design.
Individuals may be influenced by discussants and/or may influence discussants. In a
single time period, solicitation of discussants’ political preferences can only provide cor-
relations with the respondent unless a particular structure for influence is assumed.6 One
potential resolution to this problem is through analysis of panel data. This approach al-
lows for observation of change in ideology, candidate preference, and party identification
for both the respondent and the discussants.
Within the set of surveys on networks, there is seldom sufficient structure to the data
5For a potential way to address these criticisms methodologically in the context of rich network data,
see Christakis and Fowler 2008.
6This is the “reflection” problem, where trying to determine the causal mechanism of an individual with
a group is “similar to the problem of interpreting the almost simultaneous movements of a person and his
reflection in a mirror. Does the mirror image cause the person’s movements or reflect them? An observer
who does not understand something of optics and human behavior would not be able to tell” (Manski 1995,
pg 129).
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or resources available to draw causal inferences without strong assumptions. Under the
ideal set of data, it would still be necessary to test for sensitivity to the presence of un-
observed confounders before interpreting any causal evidence of discussant preferences
or behavior on the respondent. Yet, when all of these conditions are met, it is possible to
draw causal inferences on survey data without randomization of discussant treatment.
Analyzing network surveys on national probability samples have a number of ben-
efits. In particular, there is a high degree of geographic variation in the location of the
discussants with respect to the respondent across these surveys – for example, only 20%
of the discussants identified in the 2006 ANES share a household with the respondent.
Thus, one benefit of conducting these surveys is to elicit the identities of individuals with
whom the respondent discusses politics. Using geographic proxies may be insufficient in
these cases where communication about politics can take place via phone, Internet, and
other technologies – and surveys, with a set of assumptions, provide one way to under-
stand the impact of political networks.
3 Evidence for Causal Relationships in Observational Net-
work Data
By James H. Fowler
For decades, political scientists have been measuring direct person-to-person influence of
friends and family on political attitudes and behaviors (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet
1944; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). But only recently have we begun to consider how
influence may spread from person to person to person (Fowler 2005). Experimental ev-
idence suggests that these indirect effects are real, with 60% of the effect of one person
on a second person being passed on to a third in the case of voter turnout mobilization
(Nickerson 2008). But experiments are expensive and have limited external validity. The
growing availability of cheap and large-scale social network data (Lazer et al. 2009)means
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that methods to identify possible causal effects in observational data will be increasingly
important for understanding the role that social networks play in politics.
Here I outline some possible confounds that complicate causal inference in observa-
tional studies of network effects, and how researchers have begun to deal with them. If
people connected to each other in a social network exhibit similar political attitudes and
behaviors, it could be attributed to at least four processes. 1) Random clusteringmay result
when many people with the same characteristics happen to be connected to one another
by chance. 2) Homophily (which literally means “love of like”) occurs when individuals
choose to become connected to those who have similar characteristics (McPherson, Smith-
Lovin and Cook 2001). 3) Contextual effectsmay result when connected individuals jointly
experience contemporaneous exposures, such as seeing the same political advertisement.
4) Influence occurs when political attitudes or behaviors in one person cause a connected
person to adopt the same attitudes or behaviors.
3.1 Random Clustering
To estimate the influence of an “alter” (a social contact) on an “ego” (the focal individ-
ual), we must be sure that similarity of a characteristic between them is not simply due
to chance. Standard techniques such as Pearson correlation that assume independence of
the observations are not adequate because of the complex interdependencies in the social
network. To take the network into account, we must first measure the empirical prob-
ability of observing a characteristic in ego conditional on the same characteristic being
present in alter. This effect can be calculated by summing the total number of dyads (all
ego-alter pairs) in the observed network where both ego and alter exhibit the characteris-
tic, and then dividing by the number of dyads in which the alter exhibits the character-
istic. We then repeat this procedure in 1,000 randomly generated networks in which the
network topology and the overall prevalence of the characteristic are exactly the same,
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but we randomly shuffle the assignment of the value to each node. This procedure gen-
erates a theoretical distribution of conditional probabilities that could have resulted due
to chance. We can then use these values as a baseline to generate differences between
the observed network and each of the random networks. Confidence intervals can be
obtained by sorting the results and taking the appropriate percentiles (for example, 95%
confidence intervals can be obtained by looking at the 25th and 975th ranked values).
In studies of obesity (Christakis and Fowler 2007), smoking (Christakis and Fowler
2008), happiness (Fowler and Christakis 2008), and loneliness (Cacioppo, Fowler and
Christakis 2009), this method shows a significant correlation between directly connected
egos and alters, and alters up to three degrees of separation. For example, if we know
that your friend’s friend’s friend is happy, then we can do better than chance at predict-
ing whether or not you will also be happy.
3.2 Homophily
If people with the same political attitudes or behaviors tend to befriend one another, it
might create a cluster of like-minded people in the network that is not driven by influ-
ence. To control for homophily, analysts must model the friendship-formation process
that occurred prior to the current interactions that may be generating influence. Ana-
lysts must therefore focus only on those pairs that have sustained a relationship in two
or more consecutive periods. This method requires repeated measures of each person’s
characteristics and longitudinal information about their network ties (Carrington, Scott
and Wasserman 2005; Fowler and Christakis 2008a).
A simple statistical model that controls for homophily regresses the ego’s characteris-
tic on the alter’s characteristic in the current period, and includes as controls the character-
istic of both the ego and the alter in the current and previous exam. Inclusion of the ego
characteristic in the previous period typically eliminates serial correlation in the errors
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(as demonstrated by a Lagrange multiplier test – see Beck 2001), and also substantially
controls for ego’s genetic endowment (for political examples, see Alford, Funk and Hib-
bing 2005; Fowler, Baker and Dawes 2008; Fowler and Dawes 2008; Fowler and Schreiber
2008; Settle, Dawes and Fowler 2009; Dawes and Fowler 2009) and any stable tendency
to exhibit the characteristic. The alter’s characteristic in the previous period helps control
for homophily (Carrington 2005). The key coefficient in these models that measures the
influence effect is the coefficient on the variable for alter’s characteristic in the current pe-
riod. Analysts must use generalized estimating equation (GEE) procedures to account for
multiple observations of the same ego across periods and across ego-alter pairings (Liang
and Zeger 1986), and assume an independent working correlation structure for each ego
(Schildcrout 2005), though Huber-White sandwich estimates with clustering on egos also
yield very similar results.
To assess the validity of this method, Monte Carlo simulations of the model can be
used to test whether homophily tends to bias the estimate of the influence effect. In these
simulations, a population of individuals is generated, each with a feeling thermometer
score (say, for the current President) drawn from a normal distribution (this is just an
example – we could use any measure of political attitudes or behaviors). Individuals are
then allowed to form ties with a probability that is a sum of two variables: a variable
that is inversely proportional to the absolute difference in their feeling thermometer score
and a uniform random variable. The weight on these two variables can be varied so that
ties are either formed purely due to homophily, purely due to the random variable, or
some combination of the two. In other words, the weight is the percentage contribution
homophily makes towards the formation of social ties.
Each individual receives an exogenous shock to his/her score that is drawn from a
normal distribution, and the ego’s new feeling is equal to a weighted combination of
his/her own previous feeling with the shock and the average of their friends’ feelings
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(with their shocks). The weight on friends’ feelings is the influence effect (how much
do one person’s feelings about the President influence another’s?). The regression model
can then be used on the simulated data to see whether the degree of homophily affects
the estimated influence effect. This analysis is accomplished by repeating these steps
thousands of times and then comparing the “true” parameters used to simulate the data
to the estimated parameters inferred from the regression model.
Figure 1 shows two sample tests from this analysis. On the left, the “true” influence
effect is held constant at 0, and the way people form friends is slowly changed from
random formation of friendships to those that are purely driven by homophily. Note
that the regression model produces unbiased estimates of the effect that average to 0.
And, importantly, it does so even when network formation relies 100% on homophily to
generate social ties! Thus, even if people in an observed sample form friendships solely
on the basis of similarity in feelings about the President, we would not tend to find a
peer-to-peer influence effect where none truly existed.
Figure 1 Goes Here
On the right, the “true” influence effect is held constant at 0.1 and once again the way
people form friends is changed from random formation of friendships to those that are
purely driven by homophily. Here the results show that peers exert a small effect on
average, and once again the result is not biased upward by the presence of homophily.
Even if people in the sample tend to form friendships solely of the basis of similarity
in feelings, the regression model will not tend to overestimate the size of a peer-to-peer
influence effect. In fact, the main drawback to the model is that the estimated effect tends
to be lower than the true effect on average but, in this setting, this just means that the
model is conservative for effects of this size.
Finally, although people may choose friends based on an attribute other than the out-
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come of interest, this will only complicate the story in cases where this attribute is omitted
and moderately correlated with the outcome. If the correlation between the omitted vari-
able and the outcome is low, then the omitted variable will not be a source of confounding.
If it is high, then the lagged outcome will be a good proxy for controlling homophily due
to the omitted variable.
3.3 Contextual Effects
The last, and most difficult, confound is the presence of contextual effects. An omitted
variable (like a campaign) may influence both ego and alter, causing their outcome vari-
able (e.g., feelings towards a candidate) to move in synchrony even when alter has no
influence on ego. One method of controlling for contextual effects is to add a fixed effect
for each ego to the model. However, adding fixed effects to dynamic panel models with
many subjects and few repeat observations creates severe bias towards zero coefficients.
This bias has been demonstrated both analytically (Nickell 1981) and through simulations
(Nerlove 1971) for OLS and other regression models. Therefore, failure of a test with fixed
effects included does not necessarily mean that influence effects do not exist.
An alternative method is to analyze how the effect size of the association between
ego and alter changes with the direction of the social contact (Bramoulle´, Djebbari and
Fortin 2008). If unobserved factors drive the association between ego and alter friend-
ship, then directionality of friendship should not be relevant. That is, if Susan names
Paul as a friend, then we expect Paul to have an effect on Susan. However, if Paul does
not reciprocate by naming Susan as a friend, then Paul may not be affected by Susan’s
political attitudes or behaviors. If contextual effects were spuriously driving the relation-
ship between Paul and Susan, then one would not expect a directional result. The context
would cause the named friend and the namer to move up and down simultaneously;
hence, the expectation is for the namer to have an influence on the named friend. But
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in studies of obesity (Christakis and Fowler 2007, Fowler and Christakis 2008a), smok-
ing (Christakis and Fowler 2008), happiness (Fowler and Christakis 2008), and loneliness
(Cacioppo, Fowler and Christakis 2008), researchers find that namers do not have a signif-
icant influence on named friends, suggesting that the effect of named friends on namers
is at least partly due to influence.
One final way to assess contextual effects is to study the role of geographic distance.
If contextual factors are more likely to be jointly experienced by people who live near one
another than those who live far away, then we would expect the size of the effect of alter
on ego to diminish with distance. Behaviors such as obesity (Christakis and Fowler 2007)
and smoking (Christakis and Fowler 2008) do not exhibit this relationship – socially close
friends who live hundreds of miles away have as much effect on behaviors as friends who
live next door. On the other hand, affective states like happiness (Fowler and Christakis
2008b), and loneliness (Cacioppo, Fowler and Christakis 2008), do exhibit decay with dis-
tance, but this is more likely due to the need for frequency of contact for these outcomes
to spread. Importantly, those studies show that next-door neighbors influence one an-
other, but same-block neighbors do not, suggesting that neighborhood, street-level, and
even block-level effects cannot explain the effect of alter on ego.
In sum, these methods represent possible ways to tease out causal effects from obser-
vational data. They are likely to become increasingly important as we study how political
attitudes and behaviors spread from person to person to person in complete social net-
works.
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4 Measurement Error and Causality in Political Network
Analysis
By Michael T. Heaney
The Heisenberg uncertainty principle in physics can be loosely stated as the idea that
to observe a phenomenon is to change it (Heisenberg 1949). While the subject matter
is somewhat different when studying politics, this principle is relevant to observational
methods in political science. Being exposed to political research may cause subjects to re-
flect on their political identities, positions, and strategies. Consequently, they may change
their political behavior as a result of being observed. The study in which they participate
itself may be an opportunity for the respondent to make a statement about identity and
political affiliation.
As political scientists rush headlong into the study of networks, it is worth reflecting
upon how the measurement of networks potentially changes their structures – or at least
their observed structures. A growing literature has addressed questions of measurement
of social networks, generally, though it has not yet turned to measuring political networks,
specifically. This essay claims that political networks – or at least certain types of political
networks – are subject to peculiar measurement errors that are worthy of caution during
research design. Significantly, respondents may answer questions about the structure of
their networks in such a way that attempts to raise or lower the political status of other ac-
tors. Under these circumstances, the survey itself may be a cause of the observed network
structure – thus requiring some self-conscious adjustment on the part of the investigator.
This essay explores the problem of measurement error in political networks. It be-
gins by making the case for methods where the researcher and the network participant
interact directly (such as surveys, interviews, and direct observation) relative to unob-
trusive methods (such as archival analysis and indirect observation). Then it considers
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common problems of network measurement and situates them within this type of polit-
ical research. Finally, a series of methodological solutions are proposed for reducing the
causal effects of network measurement on observed network structures.
4.1 Obtrusive versus Unobtrusive Methods
A wide variety of political networks can be measured unobtrusively using institutional
records or other forms of archives. Examples of recent research using this approach in-
clude studies of international conflict (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006), legislative
co-sponsorship (Fowler 2006), caucuses in the U. S. Congress (Victor and Ringe 2009),
multiplex interest group and political party networks (Grossman and Dominguez 2009),
and the rise of institutional innovations during the Renaissance in Florence (Padgett and
McClean 2006). In these cases, the observed actors do not have the opportunity to react
to the research and, thus, cannot cause the structure of the network.
While these studies benefit from the advantages of relatively “objective”measurement
and have the ability to explore the historical evolution of networks, they face several
drawbacks as well. First, by relying only on official records, they may miss the informal
– but crucial – interactions that reflect the networks that are most relevant for politics.
Second, these studies are limited in time increments of their network measures – they
may only be able to measure the network on an annual basis, for example – thus missing
relevant changes that may occur between the intervals. Third, these studies cannot cap-
ture political developments as they occur, leaving researchers to wait passively for data
to arrive with a lag of (potentially) several years.
In contrast, other scholars directly question political actors about their networks. Re-
spondents in these studies are asked to report on their political discussion partners (Huck-
feldt and Sprague 1987), communication and influence among interest group lobbyists
(Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer 2004; Heaney 2006; Heinz, Laumann, Nelson, and Salis-
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bury 1993; Laumann and Knoke 1987), organizational memberships of antiwar protesters
(Heaney and Rojas 2007), and the political involvement of youth activists in Brazil (Mis-
che 2008). In these studies, networks are measured in one of two ways. One method asks
respondents to list their discussants or contacts in an open-ended question (Heaney and
Rojas 2007, 2008; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987; Mische 2008). The other method shows
respondents a list of network members and asks them to indicate with which members
the respondent communicates, shares resources, views as influential, or has other kinds
of network ties (Heaney 2006; Heinz, Laumann, Nelson, and Salisbury 1993; Laumann
and Knoke 2007).
Obtrusive methods to gathering political network data have special advantages. First,
they solicit individuals’ first-hand accounts of their network involvements, thus captur-
ing informal ties that may be neglected in archival and institutional research. Archival
research can only analyze ties that are officially recorded. But surveys and interviews can
ask respondents about any kind of tie: Who do you like or dislike? Whose political advice
is useful or unreliable? Whom do you consider to be your allies or adversaries? Second,
surveys and interviews facilitate the analysis of relevant political actors who might not
the subject of official recordkeeping. Record-based studies of legislative networks appro-
priately examine connections among members of Congress, but surveys may be the only
way to reveal similarly important connections among staff members, constituents, and
other less-visible actors. Third, they have the potential to capture politics “in action,”
measuring networks as they unfold dynamically. Heaney and Rojas (2008), for example,
follow antiwar organizations over time from 2005 to 2007, thus allowing them to observe
the consequences of the breakup of a major antiwar coalition. Since this kind of activ-
ity leaves few formal records, the dynamics of these politics would be lost to history in
the absence of on-the-ground collection of network data. In summary, surveys and inter-
views allow the investigator to see networks that are otherwise invisible to unobtrusive
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methodologies.
Despite the advantages of collecting network data through direct contact with partic-
ipants, this approach introduces new forms of error into the analysis. In the following
section, I outline these sources of error and suggest the how they are likely to alter causal
inferences drawn from the analysis of political networks.
4.2 Pitfalls in Network Surveys and Interviews
When respondents are asked to report on their ties, these reports are vulnerable to errors
and misrepresentation. Respondents may either fail to mention ties or may make false
reports of ties, yielding an accuracy rate of 40% to 60% in the measurement most com-
munication networks (Marsden 1990). First, the extent of these problems is, in part, a
function of the survey/interview instrument. Open-ended (recall-based) questions about
network ties are more prone to forgetting than are list-response (recognition-based) ques-
tions, though open-ended questions may also be less prone false reports (Brewer 2000).
Second, whether ties are reported may depend of the strength of tie in question, as strong
ties are more likely to be reported than weak ties (Butts 2003). Third, reporting of ties
may depend on characteristics of respondents and the characteristics of members of the
network, which Feld and Carter (2002) explain with their distinction between “expan-
siveness bias” and “attractiveness bias.” Expansiveness bias occurs when respondents
have a tendency to over- or underreport their ties with others. Alternatively, attractive-
ness bias occurs when somemembers of a network are likely to be under- or overreported
by others in the network. Fourth, further complications may be caused by data missing
as a result of boundary specification, non-response, and fixed-choice survey questions
(Kossinets 2006).
Measurement error may lead to substantial distortions in the structure of the network.
Network size, range, and density may fluctuate as a result of measurement error (Brewer
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and Webster 1999; Feld and Carter 2002). This problem can be illustrated by examining
concordance in multiple reported network ties (Adams and Moody 2007). In a study
of a whole network, each respondent is asked to report on ties with every other network
member. Where there is concordance among respondent reports – when both respondents
agree that they either have or do not have a tie – then the likelihood of measurement error
is relatively low.7 However, when one respondent reports a tie and the other does not –
an uncorroborated tie – then it is likely that someone is mistaken. The researcher then
must make a judgment about whether to insist on concordance as the basis of a tie, or to
allow discordant ties to serve as the basis of ties. Reanalysis of data on networks among
health care lobbyists, collected by Heaney (2006), shows that this distinction makes a
difference. If corroboration is required, the network centralization is reduced 27.44%,
heterogeneity is increased 25.31%, density falls 63.49%, transitivity is reduced 28.04%,
and average degree drops by 63.49%. These results illustrate the substantial changes in
the structure of a network produced by differences in measurement.
Allowing respondents to report on their network ties permits them to determine, par-
tially, the structure of the network under investigation. The consequences of this causal
effect may depend on the motivations of respondents. If respondents elect to “perform”
for the survey, the consequences may be particularly troubling. Attractiveness bias is a
particular concern because certain network members may be seen as desirable network
contacts, while others are persona non grata, thus drawing or discouraging ties that either
did or not exist in fact, depending on the desirability of the alter. Expansiveness bias is
a problem if some low-status respondents attempt to raise their status by overreporting
their ties, while high-status respondents prefer to downplay their influence by underre-
porting their ties. In either case, surveys of political actors may be especially problematic,
7Of course, it is possible that both respondents mutually refuse to admit their tie, or, similarly claim to
know each other when they do not. In these cases, concordance may exist even though measurement error
is present.
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as these respondents may wish to use the survey instrument to send a political message
or to influence the ultimate reports about which actors are most influential or central.
A reanalysis of Heaney’s (2006) data using an exponential randomgraphmodel (ERGM)
revealed that expansiveness and attractiveness biases patterns are present in the data.8
Consistent with attractiveness bias, the results show that interest groups with a stronger
reputation for influence are cited as having more communication ties than would be ex-
pected, other things equal, as interest groups with weaker reputations are cited less fre-
quently than would be expected, other things equal. Consistent with expansiveness bias,
informants that have lower ranks within their organizations cite fewer communication
ties than would be expected, while informants with higher ranks report more communi-
cation ties than would be expected. These patterns suggest that respondents report their
ties in a way that responds to their political view of and position within the network, thus
altering the causal process affecting the reported network structure.
4.3 Strategies to Address Measurement Error
If measurement interferes with causal inferences about the network, what are somemeth-
ods of correcting this problem? It is essential to recognize that the approach to measuring
political structures in the network is a choice in the research design, rather than an inher-
ent feature of the data. Thus, it is possible to alter or supplement network measures in
order to create a clearer picture of the causal process. First, researchers relying on directed
reports of undirected data – the kind of data where concordance is at issue – should es-
timate their models two ways to see how the results depend on whether or not ties are
corroborated. If either corroborated or uncorroborated ties yield the same result, this find-
ing is suggestive that causality is not strongly influenced by the measurement process. If
the results using corroborated and uncorroborated ties differ, then the researcher should
8The ERGM model is estimated using Hunter, Hancock, Butts, Goodreau, and Morris 2008’s method in
R. The results are not reported here to conserve space, but are available from the author upon request.
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investigate the discrepancy further.
A second strategy is to create multiple measures of the same network. Multiple in-
terviews with the same respondent may increase reliability (Adams and Moody 2007). If
informants are used for an organization, multiple respondents within the same organi-
zation may be more reliable than a single respondent for that organization. Turning to
third parties outside of an organization may be a way to uncover “hidden” ties – that is,
when “everyone knows” that two actors are in communication, even when they mutually
refuse to admit it.
A third strategy is to factor measurement error directly into the model in question.
By including variables that capture the effects of status, network position, or desire to
influence the survey result, the researcher may be able to parcel out the effects of network
measurement. A Bayesian approach may be particularly well suited to weighting ob-
servations according to the degree of certainty associated with their measurement (Butts
2003). Alternatively, explicitly measuring networks as directed or by retaining two-mode
structures (rather than collapsing two-mode data to one mode) is a way to make the “er-
rors” a part of what is being investigated.
A final strategy is to rethink the setting or framing of the interview/survey. Are there
elements of the research design that prompt the respondent to “think politically”? One
approach is to be sure to ask network questions before asking substantive questions about
politics or policy. Another approach would be to deemphasize the political focus of the
interview/survey by combining questions about political networks with questions about
other kinds of networks (e.g., alumnae, friendship). The less explicitly the respondents
are primed to think about the politics, the less they may see the study as an opportunity
to assert their political identity and views beyond what is called for by the questions.
Laboratory experiments that vary framing and priming within the survey may be a way
to assess the nature and extent of these effects.
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While any method of asking respondents about their political networks is likely to
influence the reported structure of these networks, this essay suggests a series of strate-
gies for reducing these effects. The Heisenberg principle applies – to observe political
networks is to change them – yet it may be possible for political scientists to gain greater
understanding of how and to what extent these networks are changed.
5 Triangulation on Causal Process
By John F. Padgett
Historians have a joke: Howdo you review an article when you don’t have time? Answer:
Don’t read any argument or data in the text. Just look in the bibliography and footnotes
and see how many different archives have been consulted.
The point of their joke is that all data are biased and lie. Even to see the bias – and
hence to avoid being captured by it – one needs another biased source against which to
triangulate. Data may or may not out-and-out contradict the reality to which they refer.
But all data, quantitative or qualitative, were produced for a purpose. This purpose of the
recorder imposes severe constraints on any subsequent researcher’s vision. They blind
him or her to concepts as well as facts that were not measured, as much as they enable
him or her to see a narrow slice of the recorder’s world.9 To rely on only one archive or
source is to be captured by the purpose of the person who originally collected the data
(perhaps most insidiously, oneself), with no chance to step outside it to see what is real.10
The point of this note is not to try to convince us to become historians. Still less is
it to launch into some post-modern canard about the impossibility of (at least relative)
truth. I have little sympathy with that. Instead I want to make the case that we should
9March and Simon (1957) called this “uncertainty absorption”. Namely, the subliminal absorption of
theories or cognitive categories about the world into the format of the data transmitted.
10This position is the essence ofWittgenstein’s argument against “private language”. Without an external
perspective on themselves, communicators cannot distinguish movement in the world from movement in
their categories of the world.
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listen carefully to what our historian colleagues are telling us in order to become better
scientists. To listen to what they say requires thinking about triangulating across multiple
sources. And it requires a slight adjustment in our core concept of causality.
In my opinion, “causality” is not an estimation technique. Causality is a process or
mechanism that does work in the world – i.e., that produces something. Two corollaries
are implicit in this definition: “Produces something” necessarily implies change. Change
that is mere static reproduction usually is less revealing of underlying causality than is
observable movement. And “world” is the thick and variegated contexts in which pro-
cesses operate. These contexts are richer than any single source or archive or measuring
instrument can reveal. Processes have consequences that ramify in multiple contexts, not
only in the context on which our attention is focused.
This article is about causality in political networks. In the context of networks, my
definition of causality implies collecting network data on (a) multiple networks (b) from
multiple sources (c) over time. In addition to offering material for triangulation, multi-
ple networks provide researchable contexts for making more precise the search for each
network’s causal dynamics.
Let us bring these points down to tangible research practice. To lay out two usefully
oversimplified stereotypes: Social scientists analyze flat-file data structures, in statistical
fashion, and historians analyze relational databases, in detective fashion. Both styles have
their strengths, but both styles also have their weaknesses. Because I am writing for
an audience of social scientists, I do not feel the need to linger on the strengths of that
approach. My emphasis in this note is rather one-sidedly on the comparative advantages
of the historians’ approach to causality.
The flat-file approach is designed for hypothesis testing. The researcher is assumed to
know ahead of time what is going on in the data. Data, selected from a precisely defined
and homogeneous sampling frame, are complete, with all variables filled in. Data col-
25
lection is assumed to be a perfect camera, which takes an accurate picture.11 Given such
heroic assumptions, probability foundations kick in to measure numerically the degree
of deviation of data from hypothesis. The emphasis always is on finding a close match
between one well-defined theory and one fixed-data slice. But the omniscience and fore-
sight assumed about the researcher in this approach are, in my opinion, unrealistic and
even narcissistic.
Historians, by contrast, deal in relational databases, whether they formalize them as
such or as index cards. Many heterogeneous data files are recorded – one or more file for
each source. These heterogeneous files are interlinked through case IDs – usually peoples’
names, but other units of cross-reference are possible as well. Missing data are the rule,
not the exception. The researcher is assumed not to know ahead of time what is going
on in the data; hence, the preferred self-conception of the researcher becomes that of the
careful detective, instead of that of the omniscient theorist.
Despite its holes and traps, the comparative advantages of the relational database
structure are two: greater ability to learn from the data, and more robust explanations.
The greater ability to learn from relational databases comes from their capacity to pick
up the object of study and examine it from multiple perspectives. Of course, there are the
biased perspectives of the various original sources themselves. But there are also the hy-
brid data structures that relational databases enable to be assembled out of these sources,
in customized fashion. The query-and-response format of relational databases encour-
ages self-consciousness about the structure of one’s detective strategy, even though it
does not enforce that. More importantly, new questions can be flexibly asked with new
slices of data, once old questions are resolved. None of this guarantees that triangula-
tion in detective search will converge, but at least query-and-response encourages the
11Or if it does not take a perfect picture, at least one assumes that the researcher knows how to correct its
imperfections.
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mentality of trying to learn from the data, rather than trying to measure the data against
oneself. My experience is that this is, in fact, what most social scientists do; they are just
not permitted to admit it.
If convergence does emerge through triangulation, the explanation or interpretation
so derived will be more robust to the extent that it has been evaluated against multiple
heterogeneous data sources, rather than against just one. Instead of being based on the
matching of one data source perfectly, confidence in explanation becomes based on the
variety and heterogeneity of the data structures confronted.
I see no reason to resist, from the scientific perspective, the historian’s emphasis on
heterogeneity of data and sources. Good science also strives for robust explanations, so
defined. It is just that our current statistical tools are not up to the task. These presume
flat files – namely, case rows with a good sampling structure, and variable columns that
are completely filled in. But as the data management world evolves beyond flat files to
relational databases, so must our methodological thinking about statistics and causality.
I put forward an illustration of one effort to do causally oriented statistics, while think-
ing historically. It may be useful to others to sketch how one designs an historical social-
and political-network data set.
Step 1: Collect data on multiple networks from multiple sources. For example, us-
ing primary-source archives, Padgett and McLean (2006) coded about 100 data files (one
separate data file coded for each archival source) about social, economic and political net-
works over time in Renaissance Florence, and cross-linked them through case IDs into
a relational database. Covering the time period from 1280 to 1500, these files include
tax records, kinship and marriage networks, economic partnership and credit networks,
guild records, political factional networks, and republican political elections and office-
holdings.
Step 2. Identify some phenomenon that changed. This could include state central-
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ization (Padgett and Ansell 1993), business organization in international finance (Pad-
gett and McLean 2006), economic credit (Padgett and McLean, forthcoming) , and family
structure and marriage (Padgett, forthcoming) . If one’s research goal is the search for
causal mechanism, the main thing is to choose to study not a static network, but one that
changed. The first descriptive task is then to identify precisely the exact date or dates of
change. This requires considerable archival knowledge of the sampling bias in diverse
sources in order to construct comparable data structures over time. But once achieved, it
is amazing how many complicated theoretical debates become clarified by the simple act
of dating change.
Step 3. Contextualize the phenomenon of interest. If one is studying change in eco-
nomic networks, put that in the context of the political and kinship networks of the time.
If one is studying change in kinship, put that in the context of economic and political
networks. If one is studying political networks, put that in the context of kinship and eco-
nomic networks. One does this through using relational database technology to assemble
from diverse sources customized data sets that answer specific questions.
Step 4. Search for the proximate causal mechanism that produced the change.12 Pre-
existing theories are helpful as intuition pumps early in the search process. But it may
surprise some to learn how quickly search devolves into an inductive detective exercise,
once abstract theory confronts complex particulars. To avoid getting stuck in dead ends,
intuition-pump theories should be plural, not singular. Multiple-network data, much less
reality, are too complicated for any single theory to exhaust.
Step 5. Process mechanism in hand, construct parallel statistical estimation exercises
and repeat them for multiple time periods, including both before and after the change.
For science, this is the ultimate objective – not just tracing change in some dependent
12As an example, Padgett and McLean (2006) found the proximate mechanism that generated a busi-
ness revolution in international finance to be political co-optation of local bankers into republican political
offices, following a class revolt. This mechanism is called “transposition and refunctionality.”
28
phenomenon of interest, but also identifying change in underlying causal relationships
within the system that produced that change.13 Timeless covering laws are ahistorical mi-
rages. But that does not negate the systematic search for period-bound causal principles.
These parallel and iterated regressions become the “confirmatory proof” of the causal
mechanism that emerged through inductive detective work.
In sum, the historically-oriented, political-network methodology that I recommend is
this: Micro-detective search for causal mechanisms through heterogeneous sources, quan-
titative and qualitative; then confirmation through statistical evidence, arrayed within
carefully controlled and repeated designs. Ultimately, confidence in one’s findings de-
rives not from any single test, but from the diversity and range of sources and tests to
which one’s interpretation is subjected. The historians’ joke is a serious one.
6 Conducting Experiments in Organic Social Networks
By David W. Nickerson
The way in which networks are formed makes drawing causal inferences about the effect
of social networks on behavior and attitudes difficult. People self-select into social net-
works and are often exposed to common outside influences (e.g., particular candidates,
factory closings, media programming). Disentangling the competing effects of selection,
and unobserved common causes from the effect of the social network using observational
data in a manner that will convince skeptics, may prove impossible. Randomized ex-
periments can often be used to surmount problems with selection bias and unobserved
heterogeneity, so conducting experiments to establish properties of social networks is an
attractive analytic strategy.
13To continue the example of the previous footnote, change in business organization was then connected
to demonstrated change in dowries and in clientage to reveal how transformation in multiple networks
were linked as different facets of macro transformation in elite structure. This process permeated multiple
domains.
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Laboratory experiments allow researchers to control and manipulate every part of
a social network: the composition, structure, and communication within the network.
Such studies are good means of establishing properties of networks in the abstract and
confirming that people conform to hypothesized behavioral strategies in assumed net-
work structures. That said, if researchers care about real-world networks (e.g., neighbor-
hoods, work places, families, legislators), then the degree to which results from social net-
works constructed in laboratories apply to the real-world network of interest is an open
question. Conducting experiments on these organically-formed, real-world networks can
solve some of these concerns about external validity.
Given the difficulty and expense of measuring social networks, researchers conduct-
ing experiments on networks may be tempted to map the social network while measur-
ing the outcome variable of interest, thereby eliminating one round of data collection.
This essay explains why network data should be collected prior to randomization if at
all possible when studying organic social networks. The lack of researcher control over
the behavior and interactions of subjects makes the up-front investment necessary. The
transparency of the analysis, improved statistical power, and ability to withstand prob-
lems encountered in the field are all improved by mapping the networks to be studied in
advance. I begin by applying the logic of experimentation to social networks and briefly
describing the form of most experiments. I then explain the reasons for pre-mapping net-
works and, in the process, describe problems that can arise when conducting studies of
social networks. This essay concludes by discussing the drawbacks of the strategy.
The logic behind randomization makes a compelling case for the use of experiments
when trying to establish causality. In the most basic form, experimental subjects are ran-
domly assigned to receive the treatment of interest or to a control group that is not ex-
posed to the treatment. Because treatment is assigned, self-selection by subjects is not an
issue. Because the assignment is random, the subjects receiving the treatment should be
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comparable to subjects in the control group with regards to both observable (e.g., age,
education) and unobservable characteristics (e.g., genetics, psychological dispositions,
exposure to unseen causes). Thus, systematic differences in outcomes variables can be
attributed solely to the treatment. By constructing theoretically perfect data, causation
can be established with a minimum of modeling assumptions through experimentation.
Compared to settings where researchers can assume that subjects are atomistic, ap-
plying the logic of experiments to organic social networks is not straightforward. The
most obvious problem is the lack of researcher control when studying naturally occur-
ring networks. In most instances, researchers cannot randomly assign subjects positions
within social networks. An exception to this rule are studies of freshman roommates (e.g.,
Sacerdote 2003) or soldiers (e.g., Goette, Huffman, and Meier 2006) where subjects have
extremely limited autonomy over living arrangements, but it is unclear how the results
of such studies translate to more typical networks where self-selection by members plays
an important role (e.g., neighborhoods, churches, work places). Similarly, researchers
generally cannot randomly manipulate communication within a social network, so the
content of conversations and interactions are not only endogenous but also in a black box
(see Nickerson 2007 for an exception, though experimentally initiated conversations may
have a different effect on subjects than everyday conversations).
As a result, most experimental studies of social networks involve imposing an external
shock to a node of a network and tracing its ripple through the network (e.g., Miguel and
Kremer 2004; Nickerson 2008). Under this strategy, researchers assign nodes (i.e., egos) to
treatment and control conditions, and thenmeasure the change in the outcome variable of
interest induced by the intervention by comparing the two types of nodes. The outcomes
are then measured for network members of both treatment and control nodes (i.e., alters).
Systematic differences in network behaviors or attitudes can be attributed to diffusion
of the treatment or outcome through the network. It should be noted that a necessary
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pre-condition for this ripple strategy to work is that the experimental treatment provided
must change the behavior of the initial node treated; otherwise, there is no ripple to trace.
Theoretically, researchers need not map networks prior to assigning and applying
treatment. Just as randomization assures balance between treatment and control sub-
jects, on average, treatment and control egos should reside in networks with identical
size, connectedness, and alter characteristics. The only requirement is that the networks
and outcomes be measured for the treatment and control groups in the exact same man-
ner, in order to avoid differences in measurement biasing results.14 As a design principle,
however, measuring and defining the social network prior to randomization is strongly
preferred for five reasons.
First, measuring the network prior to randomization provides analytic clarity. The
quantity of interest is the behavior of the network. Thus, defining the unit of analysis and
randomization in advance adds a level of transparency to the experimental protocol. By
stating upfront the network to be analyzed and its structure, the researcher removes an
area of discretion that can lead to curve-fitting and Type I errors.
Second, it is always possible that measurement of the network post-treatment could
be correlated with the provision of the treatment. If treatments cause certain relation-
ships to become more salient or networks to change composition, then many strategies
for defining networks (e.g., snowball surveys or Facebook links) may cease to be equiva-
lent for treatment and control groups. At the very least, failing to measure networks prior
to treatment assignment requires the researcher to make parallel measure an assumption,
rather than a feature, of the experimental protocol.
Third, statistical efficiency can be gained by matching egos with similar backgrounds
and network characteristics, and then randomizing within these matched strata. By cre-
14While not strictly experimental, Milgram’s six degrees of separation experiment (Milgram 1967) strat-
egy of defining the network as the treatment diffuses obviously violates this principle.
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ating strata (or even pairs) of subjects as similar as possible, and randomly assigning
treatment within these strata, the amount of unexplained variance in the experiment is
decreased. As a result of decreasing the uncertainty around the outcome variable, exper-
iments can gain considerable precision from pre-matching (Cox and Reid 2000; Rosen-
baum 2005). These gains in efficiency from pre-matching measured networks are likely
to be especially important in experimental studies of networks for two reasons. Typical
experiments have only one layer of variation by focusing on atomistic subjects (i.e., egos).
Experiments looking at networks are exposed to variation in alter and network charac-
teristics, so the reduction in unexplained variance may be even greater in these settings.
Statistical power is at a premium in social network experiments because the quantity of
interest is not the effect of the initial treatment, but the diffusion of the effect through the
network. In most settings, the diffusion of the treatment effect will be lesser than the ini-
tial treatment itself. As such, gaining efficiency through pre-matching can be especially
important to detect small ripples of the treatment effect.
Fourth, measuring networks prior to randomization allows for designs that preserve
efficiency in the face of problems encountered in the field. Despite the best laid plans,
researchers may not be able to execute the protocol exactly as planned. Applying treat-
ments to subjects in their natural habitats may be time consuming, expensive, and lead
to unexpected problems. In most cases, problems can be solved by expending more re-
sources to address the issue (e.g., low initial rates of treatment uptake or subject attrition),
but that may force the researcher to treat fewer subjects than planned. By measuring net-
works in advance, and carefully structuring the randomization procedure, protocols can
be designed where untreated subjects are rolled into the control group or excised from the
experiment (Nickerson 2005). The reasons for the lack of treatment must be orthogonal
to response to the treatment and the dependent variable, but advance work can preserve
statistical efficiency in an unbiased manner.
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Finally, knowing the structure of networks can allow the researcher to avoid contam-
ination of the treatment and control groups. The whole point of the experiment is to
measure the diffusion of the treatment, but if alters in control networks are exposed to
the treatment inadvertently, then results will be biased towards zero. This type of stable
unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA – see Rubin 1978) violation will lead to Type II
errors in most instances. By mapping in advance and conducting the experiment using
networks as disjoint as possible, researchers can help avoid this type of contamination.
Given the wide variety of connections that people hold, complete separation of networks
is unlikely, but limiting the number of known connections canminimize inadvertent treat-
ment.
Each of these five reasons for measuring networks prior to randomization, and taking
advantage of that information, is enough to suggest a best practice. Taken as a whole, the
suggestions nearly require mapping in advance, but also provide a blueprint on how to
utilize the information. Clearly defining the unit of analysis and randomization will lead
to clear and convincing demonstrations of network effects. The downside of the strategy
is that the analysis becomes far more static. The analysis will miss the dynamics of people
joining and dropping out of the network. The researcher constrains the analysis to focus
on a particular type of network (e.g., neighborhood, work place, friendship) when it may
not always be clear which network will be most salient until the treatment is provided.
A partial solution to this problem is for the researcher to measure network structure and
composition before and after the treatment is provided (which may be inexpensive de-
pending on how the outcome variable is collected). In this way, the researcher can take
advantage of the rigor pre-mapping and capture some of the dynamics and hypothesis
generation possibilities of post-treatment measurement.
Field experiments on organic social networks are an exciting technique for under-
standing social ties. However, a few words of caution about external validity are in order.
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First, the populations and treatments amenable to experimentation may be limited. Re-
searchers should be careful about extrapolating the results from one population (e.g., stu-
dents, neighbors) or treatment (e.g., voter mobilization) to other settings since the results
are likely to be highly contingent. Second, networksmay behave differently in response to
a treatment than they behave in their normal state. That is, researchers should be careful
to define the object of estimation to be the diffusion of the treatment and not the diffusion
of norms, information, or behaviors in general. Even with these concerns about external
validity, the ability to establish causation firmly should cause more political scientists to
study networks experimentally.
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8 Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Monte Carlo Simulations of Network Regression Model Show Homophily Does Not Affect
Estimate of Induction Effect
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Figure 1. Monte Carlo Simulations of Network Regression Model Show Homophily Does 
Not Affect Estimate of Induction Effect 
   
Note: Each point represents the estimated effect of alter’s feeling thermometer score on ego’s 
feeling thermometer score in one simulation of a network with the homophily weight indicated 
on the x-axis.  The dark blue line shows best fitting LOESS curve to the observed points.  “True 
effect” refers to the influence parameter used in the model to simulate the influence of alter on 
ego.  1000 simulations of a 1000 person network are shown.  Baseline distribution of feeling 
thermometer scores is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 50 and standard deviation 
10.  The shock distribution is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and standard 
deviation 5.  Other simulations (not shown) suggest the results are robust to different 
distributional assumptions. 
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